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The author is a candidate for the STD. at the John Paul II Institute in Rome.

Todd Bindig takes a provocative position in his essay "Confusion about
Speciesism and Moral Status". He proposes that we, as Catholic believers,
can find some common ground with the position taken by Peter Singer
against "speciesism". Bindig offers some tweaking to the meaning of the
term "species" to create grounds for agreement. He argues that Singer is
correct; species is morally irrelevant if it is founded merely on one's
reproductive community and historical origin. Bindig offers some very
imaginative scenarios for recategorizing human beings in a plurality of
species possibilities, i.e. the existence of another planet where beings
exactly like human beings exist, but from diverse origins and within a
separate reproductive community. Unfortunately, the supposed confusion
over the acceptable definition of the term "species" is irrelevant to Singer's
arguments. Singer is not confused about his understanding of speciesism.
Speciesism is a "morally indefensible preference for members of our own
species" (53), that is, human beings over non-human animals. He proposes
that the moral status of "persons" cannot be limited to human beings alone,
but must include non-human animals as well, if we are not to be accused of
the sin of "speciesism".
According to Singer, ethical decision making must be based on equal
consideration of interests. These interests cannot be limited to such irrelevant
criteria as intelligence or rationality, as these would be "as arbitrary as skin
color". He maintains that, instead, we base ethical decisions on sentience,
that is, a balance of pain vs. pleasure: classical utilitarianism, he claims.
Hence, since pigs, horses, and chickens are as likely to experience pain as
adult humans there can be no moral justification for not weighing their
interests equally. Personhood achieves meaning based on a being's
capacity to feel pain. Hence, according to Singer, most of us are regularly
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feasting on the flesh of persons! Only a speciesist could justify his own
taste for another being's flesh as sufficient reason to slaughter innocent
chickens. Singer repeatedly likens this to the southern slave owner of times
past who wantonly scourged other beings merely because they bad skin
color not like his own. Speciesists are no different than racists.
Bindig places himself among strange bedfellows here, since he
seems to accept a Singeresque premise, that, while infants and retarded
human beings do not actually possess characteristically human traits, apes,
dogs and several other animals "seem to have the ability to utilize rational
thought and to will." Traditional western philosophy reserves rationality
and free will as exclusive to human beings.
Singer posits the chance that human beings, since they have mental
capacities, can possibly suffer more than animals when they are threatened
with anticipated pain or death. Tltis mental suffering must be accounted for
when weighing interests. However, it is precisely this possibility of mental
suffering which the newborn infant or mentally retarded adult does not
experience, which, for Singer, may make them better candidates for
experimentation than, say, a dog which may indeed suffer anxiety and
terror at being confined in a strange place. "Sometimes animals may suffer
more because of their more limited understanding." Even with no intention
of harm on the part of its captors, "we cannot explain (to an animal) that we
are not threatening its life ... an animal cannot distinguish an attempt to
overpower and confine from an attempt to kill: the one causes as much
terror as the other." Newborn infants and mentally retarded adults, on the
other hand, probably don't recognize differences in their smTmmdings so
cannot be said to be suffering any mental anguish. This line of
argumentation gives Singer reasons for prefening the use of human
infants, "orphans perhaps", or retarded humans for experimentation, to the
use of animals "since infants and retarded humans would have no idea of
what was going to happen to them." (Practical Ethics, 52-53)
Bindig makes the mistake of assuming that by "intuition" most of us are
rightly reluctant to call other things, such as higher mammals, "persons". This
is precisely the point which Singer exploits: "intuition" has become so
obscured in our modem culture that many are not reluctant to call non-human
beings "persons". It is not uncommon to find terms such as "vegetable"
applied to human life, or "blob of cells", or "potential human", while at the
same time "Cats are people too" reads a familiar bumper sticker. Divine
design is put forth by Bindig to account for human beings being set apart
from everything else in creation. And lightly so, Divine design is the reason.
Unfmtunately, Singer rejects the entire Judeo-Cluistian tradition along with
any notion of "Divine design". According to Singer, the ethical tradition of
the sanctity of human life is a "farce" based on a now outdated religious
authority. This tradition appears valid "only while we are intimidated into
May, 2007

157

uncriti ally accepting that all human life ha orne pecial dignity or worth.
On challenged, the traditional thic crumples (Writ in s, 16 ). Th "ri e
of better under tanding' in mod m thought promi e a better ethi , one
'that do · n t need t be propped up by u·ansparent fiction no one can
really beli ve· an -thic that is m re com pas ionate and more re p n ive to
wbat p oplc decide for thernselve (ibid).
Th tenn per on a it i. u ed today ha a di tinctly Chri tian hi. tory. Jn
th early Church th Christian understanding of a Triune G d wa
chaJleng d by claim · defending monoU1ei m again t multiple (three) god .
In order to explain the doctrine of the Trinity Church fathers employed th
language f the th at r. ' Prosopon and "per ona' were term · which
referred to a ma k worn by an actor in lh theater. The actor' · character
was recognized by th mask that he donn d. One actor could play many
part · u ing different rna. k. or pro ·opon/per one. One God three Per ons.
Th evolution of the m aning of p r on i · unique to we ·tern
philo ophy and .. pecifically Chri. lian bi tory. Ev n today United Nations
documenter will w icl the u e of the word per on" in favor of
' individual' b caw e Eastern n n-Chri tian culture d not . hare our
understanding of the term. It is the Christian tradition alone which has
brought the term into useful meaning. Hence, Peter Singer's reinvention of
the term is related to his a-histmical viewpoint.
Only human beings are pers n ' , that i beiJlg of rational nature with
an immortal . pirltual s ul. Only they are creatures capable of eeking and
kn wing both U1eir Creator and through Him them elve . Only buman
being belong to the pecie · of rati nal ub ranee and therefore the genu
of Per on . Their statu. a 1er on render their live of inftnite value, over
that of every oU1er creature. Thi: value is related to tl1eir capacity for
rational thought even if by defect, that capacity will never be fully
developed or ha cea. ed to be operative. Th p · r on is de tined to live
~ r verbyrea nofthatwhi hi mostpe1fectofhim;hi pirituaJ.oul(of
a rational natur ). That which i. piritual cann t be de tr yed. 'The truth
of tl1e immortality of the . oul i. . imuJtaneou ly the truth of the
inde tructibility of th per ·on. 1
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